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JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS TO DEBATE*
ronaLd dWorki**
i. carLoS nino
I’d like to add on to my fifteen minutes, a few minutes to speak about 
Carlos Nino because, as I understand it, this is a meeting in his honor. 
I met him when I came to Argentina with some other philosophers, I 
think at an invitation arranged by Carlos, and I found him the most extraor-
dinary man, to be so gifted, and prolific and original, in legal philosophy 
and moral philosophy, really prolific and extremely interesting, and at the 
same time to be so committed to the achievement of democracy in this 
country, [of an] unflagging dedication; and I have nothing but admiration 
for him. And when I heard of his sadly, ridiculously early death, I was 
saddened, and when I arrived here, three days ago, I was saddened again 
because he was not here. 
But the memory that I would like to share with you is about a different 
quality, it’s about courage. When I was here, all those years ago, Carlos 
invited me to his house for a drink and a meal. We drove up to his house 
in his car and when we got out he pointed across the street, and there was 
a rather frightening looking Ford Falcon. I didn’t even know what a Ford 
Falcon was but he showed it to me. It looked like an ordinary, not very 
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attractive American car, and he said “that has history attached to it”, and 
then, someone got out of the car. When we arrived and we were crossing 
the street to go to his house, someone got out of the car, opened the boot or 
the trunk of the car and took out a rifle and held it up practically in his face, 
and put the rifle back into the car, and Carlos said to me “that’s meant to 
frighten me, but it doesn’t”. And I very much admire that moment.
ii. juStice for hedgehogS
I’m going to try to summarize this rather large book. The book, I think, 
is an illustration of a style of doing philosophy, which I wrote about some 
time ago. I called it an “inside out” rather than an “outside in” method 
of philosophy. That is, I started my career after I finished being a lawyer 
(that didn’t take long); I started my career with a central interest in human 
rights and political philosophy, and I thought that it would be necessary to 
concentrate, and not deal with very abstract philosophical issues. But to 
concentrate on the practical issues, I wanted to write articles in what we 
call “popular journals” (though the New York Review is perhaps not quite 
a popular journal, it still has a very wide circulation).
But as I began to work on these issues, academically, I soon disco-
vered that you couldn’t avoid the abstract issues because the difficulties 
that you encounter thinking about what ought to be done about abortion 
or affirmative action. As soon as you began to reflect about this you saw 
the importance, the crucial fossil of philosophical issues, baring on what 
you took first to be a very practical issue. And that’s what happened in the 
writing of this book. I wanted, finally, to go in the other direction. I wanted 
finally to say “now [that] I’ve thought about all these issues, now I’m going 
to try and present a philosophical position and then, at the end, point out 
the political implications of that philosophical position”. It’s true that a 
great deal of this book is an attempt to synthesize what I had studied in this 
inside out way for a long time. But in writing the book, I found that even 
more reflection on mainstream general philosophical issues was necessary, 
and so a good part of this book is my first attempt. In this summary I’m 
going to try and emphasize that process, and emphasize the general phi-
losophical issues that might not seem at first sight connected to practical 
questions of politics but which, in my view, turn out to be very central. 
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iii. SkePticiSM
The book has five parts and I’ll just mention what I take to be the 
most important, and in some cases the newest, of the thesis that I’m going 
to defend. The first one, I take to be extremely crucial, is directed against 
skepticism. I want to reject the idea that in morality and politics and ethics, 
skepticism is the natural or default position. Many philosophers have ar-
gued against moral positions, against moral claims by saying “moral claims 
can’t be true or false, they just represent our feelings, our own subjective 
reaction, and that is demonstrated by the fact that people disagree about 
moral issues; they can’t prove one position or the other, people who believe 
one thing can’t convince the other person and, therefore, morality is not an 
objective matter.”
The mistake, I believe, or so I argue in the first part, is not to realize 
that skepticism is itself a moral position. If I say “employers owe medical 
care to their employees” and someone else says “nonsense, that’s just your 
opinion, you can’t prove that”, I want to reply “well, I see you have a di-
fferent opinion; your opinion is that employers do not owe health care to 
their employees and that is as much a moral opinion as the opinion that I 
set out, and if you argue against my opinion by saying “well, people disa-
gree”, I will reply “yes, and people disagree about your moral position, for 
example, I disagree with it”. 
It’s very important, I think, to establish that there is no such thing as a 
morally neutral kind of skepticism. There is a discipline, philosophers like 
to say “we study meta-ethics and we draw our conclusions about subjecti-
vism and skepticism from an independent philosophical meta-ethical posi-
tion”. In the first part of the book I argue that that is terminally confused; 
one confusion after another.
iv. interPretation
In the second part of the book, I take up the question of how we should 
think about moral issues. I argue that there is a kind of intellectual activity 
which we ought to recognize as interpretation in general. Interpretation 
is different from explanation. I try and illustrate the difference in part II 
by talking about interpretation in art. I consider, for example: what would 
make one interpretation of a very complex poem by, for example Yeates, 
better, sounder, more accurate, than another interpretation. I won’t try and 
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summarize the theory now, it’s rather complex. But I offer that general 
account because I want to introduce another idea. First, that the analysis 
of moral concepts (justice, liberty, law) is interpretation. These concepts, 
the root concepts through which we conduct our political reflection and 
our political debates, are interpretive concepts. We can’t analyze them in 
some neutral way by distinguishing between what the concept means just 
as a matter of semantics, and what the truth is; what the concept of justice 
is or what the concept of law is, on the one hand, and on the other hand, 
which institutions are just, if our judges should decide cases. There isn’t 
any such distinction. A theory of what the concept means is a substantive 
moral theory. 
In this section of the book I also make a claim which is (it would 
be an understatement to say controversial) that the leading philosophical 
concepts, including the concept of truth, are also interpretive concepts. A 
theory of truth is a moral theory about when we ought to react to evidence 
in a certain way. So the second part of the book makes a very broad claim. 
It’s a claim that I found required, again, by starting with very practical 
issues and just seeing how the correct approach to these issues required 
a study of the most abstract philosophical issues, those that might at first 
sight seem furthest from ethics and morality. 
v. ethicS
In the next part of the book, I take up ethics. I have been for long time 
following Bernard Williams, who introduced the terminology. I have dis-
tinguished between questions of ethics, by which I mean question about 
how to lead a successful life, from questions of morality, which are ques-
tions about what we owe to other people. 
I begin with ethics (and Marcelo summarized this very eloquently yes-
terday) and with the idea of dignity. To me dignity has two aspects. The 
first part of dignity is a sense of self respect. Your dignity requires that you 
think it important that you make some success of your life, not because 
you happen to want to make a success but, the other way round, you re-
cognize you want to lead a successful life because you recognize a cosmic 
responsibility to do that. I can’t prove that to you. I think it’s a good inter-
pretation of how at least most of you lead your lives, though it might sound 
unfamiliar to you. The second part of dignity is this: one person has got to 
assume responsibility for each life and that’s the person whose life it is. I 
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suggest in that part and in the rest of the book that we ought to approach 
the interpretation of concepts of morality and concepts of political morality 
as asking for the solution to simultaneous equations, to find some interpre-
tation of what we owe others by way of aid, of when we harm others, of 
when we have obligations, of what political rights are, of what liberty is, 
equality and law. We ought to seek an interpretation of each of these ideas 
that respects both parts of dignity –both parts which at first sight seem to 
pull in opposite directions–. It seems that the first principle of dignity, that 
everyone’s life is of intrinsic importance, pushes us towards equality as a 
political idea. But it seems that the second principle of dignity, which re-
quires people to take individual responsibility for their own lives resisting 
any attempt by government to hold them, to usurp that responsibility, that 
seems to push in the direction of liberty. Therefore, the correct account, in 
my view, of liberty and equality must be one that shows the two virtues not 
only compatible but each drawn from the other, because only in that way 
could we achieve solutions to the problem, to the conceptual problem, that 
fully respect individual dignity. 
Most of the latter part of the book is an attempt to produce theories for 
all of these concepts: justice, liberty, democracy, law, justice; an attempt 
to produce conceptions of these which solve the simultaneous equations of 
dignity, truly respect the dignity of people one by one, and that also serve 
as good interpretations of our political practice. 
How far I succeed in this can luckily only be judged by you, once 
you’ve read the book. Thank you.
vi. deBate
VI.A. Law’s Completeness and Consistency
Q (Prof. Eugenio Bulygin) – In more than one occasion you insisted 
that the law, law probably integrated with these moral principles and so on 
and subject to best light interpretation, always has an answer, a right an-
swer to every question and to every legal problem. Does this idea mean that 
law, with its principles and so on, is always complete and consistent, that 
there are no situations where the law is silent, doesn’t give any answer? 
There are no situations where the law gives more than one answer? This is 
my question.
A – You state my case very well, and I take it that your question is 
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“how could any possibly believe that?” (Laughs) I don’t think I’ve ever 
said that in every case there is a right answer. And if you include the possi-
bility of the law being in conflict on some issue, then I have to say I don’t 
rule out the case we encountered in mathematics, for example, where there 
really are right answers. I don’t rule out the case where the right answer is 
“there is a conflict, there is contradiction”. I don’t think that it can often be 
the case; indeed I never encountered that. I don’t know anyone else who 
has either. If you think about the solution to a legal problem as the best 
interpretation of the legal material, the best account of what the political 
community has done by way of legislation, what is done by the way of 
precedent, what the Constitution says, what the history of the Constitution 
has been, if you understand that what is required of you is the best inter-
pretation of all of that material, then the idea that there wouldn’t be a best 
interpretation becomes very strange. The appeal of the idea (that’s a very 
popular idea) that sometimes there is no right answer, [that] we just have to 
acknowledge the law is silent on the subject, the appeal of that idea I think 
comes from what I described as a fallacy, and what I attempted to identify 
as a fallacy in the first part of the book, and that is that skepticism which 
says “no, there isn’t really one right answer”, is the default position, that is, 
the position that you fall back on if no other argument seems compelling 
to everyone. And, of course, the history of legal philosophy is full of that. 
People say “some lawyers think this, some lawyers think that, therefore, 
there is no right answer”. Very puzzling confusion, I think. No, it doesn’t 
mean that because that there is your view that in some cases there is no 
right answer is itself a theory, which is an interpretation of all the vast legal 
material, and that interpretation is as much candidate to be the best inter-
pretation, and is as subject to the objection “well, people don’t agree”, as 
any more positive theory of what the right answer is. We are all in the same 
boat. The one reason why my view might seem so paradoxical is a failu-
re to distinguish between two important ideas: one is uncertainty and the 
other is indeterminacy. Indeterminacy is the view that there isn’t any right 
answer. Uncertainty is the view that I don’t know what the right answer is. 
I don’t even know whether there is a right answer. Uncertainty is the real 
default position. We think, and think and think, and you decide, “honestly, 
I can not see any daylight between the two rival readings of the law”. If I 
can’t see any daylight I should announce that I’m uncertain about what the 
right answer is. But if I go on to say there is no right answer, I’m no longer 
resting on uncertainty, I am saying I know the best interpretation of the 
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legal material, I’ve resolved the issue in my own mind: the best interpre-
tation produces conflict, or produces gaps in the law, or produces silence 
on particular questions. You need an argument. You need an argument to 
why that’s the best interpretation. Given the enormous amount of material 
available for legal interpretation, I find it very implausible that that would 
be the best interpretation. If you have only a very small amount of data, 
perhaps; but if you have a century of legislation, precedent, administrative 
agencies, the rulings, I find it extremely improbable that you could make 
a case that would say “the best interpretation is some kind of a tie”. Now, 
I know that doesn’t convince you, because you and I have discussed this 
question before. But that’s the best I can do. (Laughs) 
VI.B. Truth and Moral Skepticism
Q (Prof. Martín Farrell) – Prof. Dworkin, you wrote in your book and 
you talked again today against moral skepticism, but explicitly in your 
book you accept the two main tenets of moral skepticism: first, there is no 
truth by correspondence in morality, and secondly, the truth by coherence 
is a necessary condition but not a sufficient one. Of course, you employ the 
word “truth” in your book and you have every right to do it, but you use 
“truth” in a very different sense. A proposition is true when it is supported 
by the best arguments or the most reasonable arguments, but this is not the 
sense of truth meaning by skepticism. So, I’m a moral skeptic and I have 
no quarrel with your position. It seems to me, that you’re employing the 
sense with another meaning and you’re not refuting moral skepticism, but 
your tenet is perfectly compatible with it.
A - Thank you, very interesting suggestion. As I said in my summary, 
I think an actually quite central, crucial part of my overall argument is a 
theory of truth, and I have a chapter, or part of a chapter in which I argue 
that truth is an interpretive concept. The “coherence theory of truth” which 
you mentioned, the “correspondence theory of truth” which you mentio-
ned, are two interpretations of the idea we use very freely. Somebody says 
“affirmative action is unfair” and another person says “that’s not true”, and 
we understand exactly what’s happening. The question is how are we to 
understand what truth actually means in these cases. In the case of science, 
it’s a very popular view that we understand truth when we say “a propo-
sition is true if it matches reality, if it corresponds to reality”. Nobody has 
ever been able (it’s part of the popularity of that theory) to make much 
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sense of it. It’s not, by any means, a clear account of what truth means even 
in science, but it’s very popular and people are working to try and explain 
in what way a word can correspond to a collection of molecules, and these 
are very serious problems. 
When we come to a different domain, our ideas about what makes a 
proposition true ought to be sensitive to the requirements of that domain. 
We couldn’t use a “correspondence theory of truth” for ethics or morality 
because there is nothing to correspond to. I had some fun in this book be-
cause I talk about “morons”, meaning moral particles that act the way elec-
trons and protons might, and it is a kind of joke that I keep repeating pro-
bably too often. But you couldn’t make sense of a “correspondence theory 
of morality” without making the mistake that Hume warned us against, by 
saying [that] there is no description of facts from which we can extract a 
moral proposition. 
So, once we accept that truth is an interpretative concept, we need an 
interpretation of truth that fits the way we conceive morality. And I believe 
that the idea of interpretation gives us the sense of truth. As Bernard Wi-
lliams said in his book “Truth and Truthfulness”, when we come to offer 
a theory of truth, we shouldn’t think of truth alone, we should think of the 
family of virtues into which truth fits. So, we think of truth from these: 
sincerity, accuracy, responsibility and the other nest of words. We try to 
understand truth as part of an entire family of concepts of which we have 
to make sense, we have to interpret each in the light of the others. And 
when we do that, yes, we have a theory of truth which is not on the list of a 
metaphysics or epistemological text. There you see correspondence, cohe-
rence, you see another much more popular theory of truth which is called 
“minimalist” or “detachability theory of truth”. These are all candidates 
for a theory of truth. They may or may not suit different enterprises. They 
don’t (any of them) suit morality. We need to do a fresh interpretation. If 
we take the alternative and say “because none of these accounts truth that 
make sense in science or might make sense in science, don’t fit morality, 
there is no truth in morality”. In my opinion, that’s bad philosophy. You 
have to look at the enterprises of morality, enterprises in which truth figu-
res centrally and try to interpret the idea to see if you can. So I accept your 
suggestion that the account of truth I’ve developed is not recognizable in 
the list of familiar understandings of truth. That doesn’t rule it out. 
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VI.C. Grotius and the Nature and Content of International Law
Q (Prof. Andrés Rosler) – I’d like to cash in on the opportunity you’re 
giving us to go back to your talk of yesterday, if I may. If I remember 
well, you argued that – your talk was given in the spirit of Grotius, that 
there is a Grotian ring to it. But I’m not quite sure whether that’s what you 
really mean in the following sense, perhaps my question would be what 
you mean by Grotian in this sense, and by the spirit of Grotius, and I’d 
like to add two short points. The first one is, when it comes to the nature 
of international law, I think Grotius is actually well known for defending 
a positivist reading of the nature of international law. He claims that the 
source of international law is actually conventional and, on the other hand, 
when it comes to the content of international law, Grotius is also, I think, 
well known for defending a sovereign system of states, which of course 
they do apply principles of natural law or morality, but perhaps we are 
wrong in reading Grotius in this sense. Actually, it is Hobbes the one who 
claims that, when it comes to the nature of international law, is nothing but 
principles of natural law. And by that he’s also taking to claim that there is 
no international law, it’s quite the contrary, but that’s a different ball game 
altogether. So, what [do] you mean by the spirit of Grotius, and the Grotian 
ring to your position on the nature and content of international law?
A – Thank you very much. In some famous Humphrey Bogart film, 
I’ve forgotten which one or which character says it, but someone says, I 
think to the policeman: “but you’ve arrested all the wrong people” and he 
says with a smile “I was misinformed”. And that may be the explanation 
of my account of Grotius. Perhaps I was misinformed. I have colleagues 
at NYU, international lawyers, who described Grotius to me in that terms 
that I used and gave me various things to read and from those I took the 
view that Grotius thought that international law begins in the requirements 
of states, that it’s not just a matter of what states consent to. But I have to 
say, I’m not wedded to that interpretation. I appeal to Grotius in an attempt 
to say that my theories are not so original after all; they were once popular. 
And perhaps I’m wrong in that. I don’t think so because my memory of 
what I read about Grotius is not what you summarize. But if it is, I correct 
by withdrawing the name Grotius and keeping everything else the same. 
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VI.D. Hume’s Principle and Moral Epistemology
Q (Prof. Horacio Spector) – Professor, I have a question concerning 
part I of Justice for Hedgehogs. On page 44 you say that Hume’s princi-
ple is both a principle of moral-epistemology and that it is obviously true 
for you. Now, I think that there is an inconsistency in your assertion that 
Hume’s principle is a principle of moral-epistemology because, after all, 
the whole argument in part I of your book is that there are no principles 
of moral-epistemology or principles of external meta-ethics so I had to 
conclude that when you say that Hume’s principle is a principle of moral-
epistemology you are referring to other people’s opinions. So it seems to 
me that in your own viewpoint you should say that Hume’s principle is 
a normative principle or a principle of morality. Now, if it is a principle 
of morality, and in some way it comes from an interpretation of our mo-
ral practice, then it’s obvious to me that it is not obviously true, because 
for instance it is not obvious that you cannot state the fact that you are 
watching a child starving as a self-sufficient case for the moral claim that 
that’s something bad and that you should do something about that. So, as a 
normative principle, it’s very controversial.
Now, and I finish, if you really abandon the general claim that there are 
no principles of moral epistemology, and after all there is one external se-
cond order question, which is precisely Hume’s principle, then in that case 
it’s not obvious to me either that the principle justifies your claim about the 
independence of morality from philosophical argument in moral philoso-
phy. And the case seems to be very clear because even if Hume said (which 
is also very controversial) that you cannot infer an “ought statement” from 
an easy statement, or at least that you should give an explanation why you 
are allowed to draw that conclusion, it’s obvious and evident to me that he 
never thought about permissions, let alone moral permissions, so it seems 
very evident at the same time that you can’t take a factual claim as a case 
for rejecting an “ought claim” which means as a case for grounding a per-
mission. Now, after all, this is very widely accepted in moral philosophy. 
For instance, Kant said that the fact that some action is factually impos-
sible, for instance a doctor cannot for factual reasons save a patient’s life, 
then if that’s factually impossible, then you have a case for rejecting the 
ought, which means that after all it is –although very sadly – permitting the 
doctor not to save that patient, because that’s factually impossible.
Now if you, and I finish with this, if you take the different principle 
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that the factual claim can reject oughts and found permissions then, after 
all, external skepticism seems to be reasonable. That’s why I think there is 
something which seems to me wrong, and either way I’d like some clarifi-
cation on that. Thanks.
A – That was what we call a very “meaty” question: a lot in it. I’ll 
start by saying that I didn’t mean to say “there’s no such thing as moral 
epistemology”. On the contrary, in a chapter devoted to moral responsibi-
lity, I say –I think– that moral responsibility is a moral epistemology. This 
goes back to the question about truth, that is, if you take epistemology to 
be the study of when we are entitled to claim knowledge or justify belief, 
then I say the scientific epistemology fits only science. For morality we 
need a moral epistemology. Moral epistemology is a theory of moral res-
ponsibility, a theory of what you ought to have done by way of reflection 
before you should treat yourself as justified in holding a moral position. I 
believe that’s an epistemology, it’s just not a scientific epistemology. As we 
want to have a different conception of truth for different domains, so we 
should have a different conception of epistemology. So I plead guilty to say 
Hume’s principle is a piece of moral epistemology. I also accept what you 
then said, that it’s a moral principle, because every theory of moral respon-
sibility itself rests on a moral theory. You can’t get out of morality, that’s 
what I mean by the independence of morality. That is for many people an 
objection. There’s no way to get outside of morality to test it from the out-
side. No, I don’t think there is. There is incidentally no way to get outside 
mathematics to test it from the outside. An so forth. So on the question of 
classification I don’t think what I say about Hume’s principle is in any way 
inconsistent with the rest of what I say, though you may continue to think 
otherwise.
Now, on the question of the substance of Hume’s principle, you say 
you see a baby being tortured and you say “that is obviously wrong, and 
I have a moral responsibility to try to stop it”. Now, the classical expla-
nation of that, of course, that’s a phenomenological fact, that is just how 
you respond. You don’t then say “now, let me see whether there’s a moral 
premise of the form ‘if someone is suffering and I can do something about 
it’”. As Bernard Williams once said in a different context, “if you thought 
you should check the major premise, you have one thought too many”. 
Phenomenology is absolutely as you say, but the reconstruction of it must 
presuppose a more general moral theory, innate in all of us, probably hard-
wired into us. But still, a major premise. And the way you contest that is 
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to imagine some real monster. The world has known real monsters in the 
last century. Imagine a real monster who confronts this situation and says 
to you “no, I don’t accept the implication, there’s a baby screaming, how 
amusing”. And you say to him “that’s intolerable”, and he says to you 
“why?”, and I believe you would be tempted at this point to propose a more 
general moral theory about the nature of evil, I would think. In any event, 
I think Hume is right, I don’t think that you could make a construction that 
didn’t assume that. 
Here’s another way to put the point. Baby is crying, you feel you have 
to respond immediately, that it’s a moral imperative. But you find on reflec-
tion that you don’t believe [in] any general principle that says you ought 
to respond to harm in front of you. You may have to correct your initial 
impulse. That’s enough on Hume’s principle.
Now, on permissions, Kant said “ought implies can” – and you gave 
a good illustration of Kant’s principle. What is the status, what kind of a 
judgment is the judgment “ought implies can”? It’s not a conceptual claim, 
it’s not analytically true, it’s a moral judgment. And it’s a moral judgment 
that many people over time have rejected. Oedipus could not have known 
that the man he slayed at the crossroads was his own father. Still, he put his 
own eyes out, out of a sense of moral guilt. He did not say to the Thebans 
“ought implies can, so I’m guiltless”. We do, most of us most of the time, 
accept the Kantian view. We don’t feel guilt for something we don’t think 
we should feel guilt when we couldn’t have done anything about it. And 
that is not a universally held view, it’s certainly a moral view.
The bus – here’s another example. The bus driver, driving a school 
bus, through no fault of his own, the breaks fail, and several children are 
killed. He spends the rest of his life baring a sense of regret merging into 
guilt, though he couldn’t have done anything about it. That’s also a part of 
the phenomenology. 
So I think that “ought implies can” is a moral principle, it’s a general 
moral principle, it helps confirm Hume’s law. Because we rely on it to vali-
date more specific moral claims like “the bus driver shouldn’t feel guilty”. 
VI.E. Feeling as a criterion for correction
Q (Prof. Guibourg) – I would like to understand this simple point: 
The criterion to tell correct behavior from an incorrect one is then just our 
feeling?
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A – No, it’s not just our feelings. It is: if we’re correct in our feelings, 
it is the correctness of our feelings; it’s the truth of what these feelings 
reflect. Because we have to distinguish indeterminacy from uncertainty, 
because skepticism or subjectivism is not a default. If in my best judgment 
torturing prisoners in Guantanamo Bay is wrong, that is, I think about it 
and my best judgment is that it’s wrong to do what the United States go-
vernment did, if I’m right, then it’s wrong, then it was wrong. But it’s not 
wrong because I made the judgment. It’s wrong if my judgment is correct. 
So it’s not just my feelings that make it wrong; it’s the case, the adequacy 
of the argument that I have that makes it wrong.
I think I want to repeat that I regard one of the main claims of part I 
of the book to answer the question or the suggestion that if we can’t pro-
ve something to the satisfaction of everyone, then we should be skeptical 
about it and say “well, it’s just a matter of my feelings”. I don’t think that’s 
a different simple philosophical position, it’s a very popular philosophical 
position, so I hope people read Part I of my book. 
VI.F. Physicalism
Q (Tamara Tenenbaum) – I apologize if my question is too philosophi-
cal or technical or something, but I wanted to know if you have any idea, 
if you have given some thought of what kind of physicalist story fits with 
your account. Because I think one of the many problems of everyone who 
tries to be… I think you should choose some variety of non reductive phy-
sicalism (Dworkin: I’m sorry, I’m having trouble understanding). I’d like 
to know what kind of physicalist story, philosophically speaking, you em-
brace, or you think fits with your theory, because you reject supervenience 
in the book, right? You seem to reject it, Davidsonian supervenience. And I 
didn’t find much about Putnam either, just in the footnotes. I think you re-
ject that too. You also reject intuitionism, and you just spoke against some 
sort of reductive emotivism or something, in the last answer. So, have you 
given some thought about that? Because it’s a problem, if you’re going 
to defend the independence of value or something like that. How are you 
going to make that fit?
A – It fits with physicalism as a separate domain, it is not at all phy-
sicalist. Let’s say we abbreviate and we suppose that physics is about the 
physical world and psychology is about the mental world. I do not believe 
that we can reduce the mental world to the physical world. I’m not a belie-
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ver in that reduction. I don’t believe that we can reduce the mathematical 
world to the physical. I’m not a believer in nominalism in mathematics. 
And now to your point, I don’t believe we can reduce value to physics. I 
think we need to use another technical word, I’ll probably get into trouble 
as with epistemology. But if we want an ontology, a general theory of what 
there is, of what exists, then we have to recognize different domains. And 
what exists includes atoms, ideas, numbers, and moral obligations. These 
are all things that exist. They don’t exist in the same way, you can’t restate 
a mathematical proposition as one about molecules. But they all exist. Our 
ontology must be driven by our conviction, not the other way around. We 
can’t say we are physicalists, therefore we have to fit everything into phy-
sics. You might – I mean, there was a time, in Germany in the 19th Century, 
when it went the other way. Ideas are the only real thing, and therefore we 
have to fit the physical world into the psychological world. I don’t see why 
any of that is necessary. I think we first decide what is true, and then we see 
how we should arrange our ontology to match our convictions. 
VI.G. Ethical Independence and the Seatbelt Case
Q (Ezequiel Spector) – Prof. Dworkin, I have a question about what 
you call ethical independence. On the one hand, you claim that a law can 
violate ethical independence in virtue of the foundational character of the 
decisions that this law inhabits. On the other hand, you claim that if the 
government obligates people to wear seatbelts, that government doesn’t 
violate ethical independence because you say seatbelt convictions are not 
foundational. However, as you claim in the book, it is empirically possible 
that there is a person who thinks that a life that runs danger is more attrac-
tive. You admit that but you continue claiming that seatbelt convictions are 
not foundational. So, I wonder what the definition of “foundational” is. 
Most people don’t have seatbelt convictions, but the definition of “foun-
dational” cannot depend on the majority opinion. Maybe “foundational” 
means relevant, but in that case, that definition arbitrarily excludes certain 
convictions such as seatbelt convictions. 
A – Thank you, very interesting question. I probably did not take 
enough care to define “foundational”, but the idea I have in mind is that 
people who have a self-conscious sense of personality, a sense of how they 
want their lives to go, what is important in those lives, when we reconceive 
people’s convictions about how they live in that way, then we can say some 
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things are more important than others to that project. There are convictions 
about religion, for example. They really are fundamental; you can’t ima-
gine not living in accordance with that. Now, other views are peripheral, 
they are ephemeral, they are just something of the moment. But they don’t 
fit into a more general scheme. I agree with you and I think I did say in 
the book that for some people a life of daredevil is the only fulfilling life. 
They jump out of airplanes with parachutes, they climb very dangerous 
mountains where you have to hit nails into the mountain in order to get 
up or down. There are people perhaps who regard putting on a seatbelt 
is self-betrayal. So the question is: what should the response be to these 
people? There are two points I think one might make. The first is that these 
people are so few that equal concern for them does not require the expense 
that would be involved in having a general seatbelt law but exemptions for 
them. And you imagine a trial in which they were invited to testify as to 
their daredevil quality. It would just be unreasonable to expect government 
to try to administrate a program like that. The second point to make which 
I think is necessary is that people who are injured in automobile accidents 
injure everyone in the community. The external cost both to the economy, 
in their absence from the workplace, and, worse, in the medical expenses 
that are incurred in taking care of them, particularly in a country like this 
one in which medical care is paid for out of the general tax revenues, it 
would be wrong to say “the government doesn’t have to rely on what I take 
to be a forbidden justification, it doesn’t have to say “your conception of a 
good life is wrong”, it has only to say “it would be unfair to the community 
to ask the community to bear the cost of this particular [and] very unusual 
preference of yours”. So I think it passes the test of ethical independence. 
VI.H. Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
Q – If you don’t mind, I’d like to come to yesterday’s conference and 
make sure I understood you correctly on one point. You talked about the 
duty of the state to protect its own legitimacy and you also talked about the 
duty to litigate. My question is: what, in your opinion, grounds this duty? 
And my second question is: do you see a connection or a nexus with the so 
called “duty or responsibility of the state to protect”?
A – Yes, thank you. What I tried to suggest yesterday begins in the 
idea that it is a central concern, should be a central concern, of people who 
exercise coercive power, police, guns, armies over other people, to protect 
Lecciones y Ensayos, Nro. 94, 2015
dWorkin, Ronald, “Justice for Hedgehogs to Debate”, pp. 373-395
390
their moral title to do so. Of course, anarchists think government is always 
immoral because nothing can justify the use of force, particularly collec-
tive force, against an individual, so they reject most of government. But, 
if you don’t accept that view and government, generally, obviously, does 
not accept that view, then a government should try always to improve its 
moral title to govern. If it believes that it is shown to the government that it 
is violating human rights, for example by discriminating against one race 
or group, then it has a duty, flowing from the fact that it exercises collective 
power, to improve its right to remove a stain on its legitimacy. So that is a 
background assumption that I make, it’s a general assumption of political 
morality. Now, the key point in the argument I offered is that the legitimacy 
of each particular state depends in part on the international understandings 
that bestow rights to govern on particular territory and limit the power of 
government to address issues on other territories. We have that understan-
ding. The only way we could give up that international arrangement is by 
moving to one world government, which is not going to happen… can’t 
happen. Therefore, if we identify a problem touching legitimacy, a stain 
on legitimacy, inherent in the international understanding, then we, each 
nation, have a duty to mitigate that so far as we can, to take steps, just as we 
have a duty to do it domestically by stopping discrimination, so we have 
a duty internationally to improve the international system, to remove the 
difficulty it poses on our own domestic legitimacy. And that seems to me to 
be only the beginning of an explanation of the need for, and the character 
of, international law. International law is what gets created when states 
recognize their duty to mitigate the injury that the international unders-
tanding, the Westphalian system, poses to people. Now, one of the threats 
(I mentioned this but your question invites me to say more) to legitimacy 
created by the international system is this: people the world over feel a 
moral responsibility of rescue. If we see [that] people in the Sudan or in 
Libya or in a hundred other places, are victims of very serious denials of 
human rights and they suffer their disease, their hunger, where a tsunami 
take place and people are dying in great masses and their own government 
is unable to feed them, [to] get food to them, as in Asia; we feel we have 
a moral responsibility to help, but we can’t, because the international un-
derstanding allows the government of Burma to say “we refuse to accept 
any food sent from abroad, we won’t distribute it, we’re immune from 
your help”. Now, I regard that as a problem, and international law ought 
to respond to it. The doctrine that you mentioned, sometimes called R2P 
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- responsibility to protect - was endorsed by a convention in Canada some 
years ago, and then endorsed in principle around the world, including in 
a meeting of the United Nations Comittee. That is an example of what I 
meant yesterday by the impact of salience. Once that has happened, then 
it focuses the general amorphous duty to mitigate in a particular direction. 
So we ought to respond in the spirit of the convention called R2P and the 
right way to respond is to accept that the General Assembly of the United 
Nations by majority of votes, can authorize protection of people in other 
countries. I’m sorry, it’s a long way to answer, but that’s the assumption. 
VI.I. What is the Law and What it Should Be
Q - You want to differentiate two different questions: what a law is and 
what the law should be, and you also say that these different questions can 
receive different answers. But, what I don’t understand very well because 
according to your account of law, an answer to “what law is” presupposes 
an answer to “what law should be”. 
A – Thank you. I’ll try to answer you this way: What the law is and 
what law should be are both moral questions but they are different kinds of 
moral questions. I think of law as based in interpretation of a nation’s poli-
tical practices and past decisions. It might very well be that it is impossible 
to interpret this tradition in what you and I would think is the best moral 
light. We think –I’ll give you perhaps a rather complex example. I think 
that the law in the United States should be that each school child gets the 
benefit of the same amount of money spent on his or her education. That is 
what the law should be in my view. But it is absolutely plain, given various 
decisions by the Supreme Court, that I could not interpret, even trying to 
make the best interpretation, I could not interpret the law of the United 
States as including that requirement.
The moral question “what should the law be” is open ended, it doesn’t 
say anything of which institution would have the responsibility to create 
the law to make it that way. What the law is? If I say something is the law, 
then I say that this is a right which people are entitled to have enforced, 
right now, on their demand through the use of the state’s coercive power. 
The moral question “what should the law be in an ideal world?” is to me 
obviously different from the question of what are people entitled to have 
enforced right here and now through the coercive power of the government. 
That’s the difference between what the law is and what the law should be. 
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VI.J. Responsibility in Contexts of Inequality
Q (Prof. Roberto Gargarella) – Let me ask you a question myself. 
I’m sorry because I will change the subject completely. I wanted to ask 
you about something you touched just a little bit in your book, which is, 
I think, very relevant for countries like Argentina or Brazil, which has to 
do with the connection between responsibility and inequality. You say a 
little in a couple of paragraphs but if you could elaborate a little bit more 
to help us to think about crime committed by people coming from rotten 
social backgrounds. I guess your view is that in some occasions we may 
discount the responsibility in view of the injustices they suffer. I don’t 
know if that is correct but that is a very important point. So, it’s not as-
suming a position like Judge Blackmun assumed at one point saying in a 
way, touching on “the capacity of these people”, but you wanted to say 
we have to take into account the injustice they are suffering. So, if you 
could elaborate a little bit on that and, also, in the face of some of these 
injustices, just to take an example you knew when you were in Brazil, 
imagine the occupation of empty state land by an extremely disadvanta-
ged group, as an interpretation of law would you call that a violation of 
law in the first place? 
A – Thank you! I love questions that say “I would like you to talk for 
a while”, but the problem is, you then have to stop me. What I meant in 
the discussion that you have in mind was governed by the general topic of 
that chapter, and the chapter is a chapter on the old philosophical problem 
of free will. I was anxious first to say that people who come from deprived 
backgrounds and are more likely to be antisocial, or to be thieves, do not 
suffer from lack of free will. It is sometimes argued that they do. There was 
an infamous case in Florida in which somebody was accused of…I think 
it was murder, and his defense was “I didn’t have free will, because my 
mind was taken over by watching television programs in which murders 
where regularly committed, so my free will was taken over because I was 
programmed by these television programs”. 
The first thing I wanted to say is that that is an extremely bad argu-
ment. We do not lose free will because we grow up or live in circumstances 
in which our motives are different and our motives arise out of injusti-
ce. People who come from very deprived backgrounds, have beliefs about 
what they are entitled to, and have needs, and have motives that people 
from middle class backgrounds do not have. But that’s not a problem of 
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their free will, they are free as we are or as anybody to assess a situation 
and act in a courtroom. 
Is that the end of the story? I want to say no, that’s not the end of the 
story. We have to be conscious when we ask how responsible they are; not 
just of whether they had free will, of whether they were automatons direc-
ted by terrible motives. We have to take into account the fact that they had 
different needs and motives, and we have to accept that in an unjust society 
we share part of the blame for the differences. So, they’re not insane, they 
don’t lack free will, but they are entitled to the benefit often of reduced 
sentences, and sometimes -in very rare cases- of acquittal on the ground 
that when you distribute the fault, the fault from what they did, is in good 
part the fault of the economic system, the social system that we created.
I don’t know if anyone here has ever heard of an American lawyer, 
long dead, named Clarence Darrow. He was the most famous criminal 
lawyer in America, and he was hired to defend two boys, very rich boys, in 
Chicago, who kidnapped another boy and killed him for fun. They’d read 
Nietzsche, they said, and Nietzsche inspired them, and Clarence Darrow 
made the famous argument that even in the case of these rich boys, socie-
ty should assume part of the blame, because the unjust economic system 
allowed these boys of such privileged backgrounds as to make them think 
that they were Superman, that they were a Nietzschean Superman. I always 
think of that argument as a reverse coin of the normal kind of argument, 
and I think Darrow’s argument was wrong, but that’s the kind of argument 
we should be making, nothing to do with free will or insanity. 
VI.K. Abortion
Q (Prof. Marcelo Alegre) - These last weeks the debate on abortion 
started in the Argentine Congress. I want to ask you if you please could 
try to illuminate our discussion, so, if you could briefly tell us your philo-
sophical take on the issue. But also, and specially I will ask you to take 
into account the experience of the last 40 years of America, how can that 
experience of what has happened since Roe v. Wade to now can help us to 
better deal with this controversial problem. 
A – Good, I’m happy for the opportunity to speak on a contemporary 
political issue. In my view, the question of abortion has got to involve two 
stages of thinking. A first stage is a question of whether an early fetus is 
a person with rights of its own, a person with interests and rights of its 
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own. Sometimes it’s said government shouldn’t make that decision: it’s a 
religious decision, it’s a metaphysical decision - government should not 
make that decision. In my opinion government must make that decision. 
The government may not take the position that, in the United States, the 
states can decide whether a fetus has interests and rights of his own. The 
question is whether a fetus is a constitutional person, that is, somebody 
who the Supreme Court, the Courts, the legislature, have a moral duty to 
protect from murder.
I don’t think that the argument that an early fetus is a person with 
rights, doesn’t matter if we call him a person. The key question is whether 
we should recognize it is having a right to live. I think the answer to that 
question must be “no”, because a creature doesn’t have interests before it 
has sentience, that is, before it can feel and feel pain. According to some 
theories a creature doesn’t have interests until it has a kind of self-con-
sciousness, which comes later. That’s a difficult theory because of its im-
plication for animals who never have, or so we think, self-consciousness. 
But at least in the case of sentience, that is, the ability to feel pain, I think 
it extremely implausible - and so did the Supreme Court - to suppose that 
something that can’t feel, that have no sense of himself, even at the level 
of feeling pain, has interest. We may have an interest in it, but it has no 
interest of its own and, obviously, the question can be debated back and 
forth for longer, but I simply report my own view on this question. It’s the 
view of the Supreme Court, it is also the view, I must say, of many of the 
opponents of abortion in the United States, because they argue that the 
question of whether abortion should be prohibited is a question best left to 
democratic decision. If a fetus is a person with interests and rights of its 
own, you can’t leave that question to democratic decision any more than 
you can leave the question of whether Jews or Muslims have rights and 
interests of their own - can’t have a situation where the majority can say no. 
I add that only to say that not many people actually think that a fetus has 
rights in its own. Polls even among Catholics say that most Catholics think 
that a pregnancy that begins in a rape should be permitted to be terminated 
and, of course, that would be wrong if a fetus was a person, a constitutional 
person. I should say that there are people that do hold the view, they are 
a small number but they do hold the view, that even a woman who was 
raped or even a woman who will die if the pregnancy is continued, has no 
right to an abortion, but they are very few. Now, the question is - which I 
regard as the interesting question, if you believe that, is the debate over? 
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Is that the end of the story? And in the book “Life’s Dominion” I argued 
that that is not the end of the story, because even if a fetus is not a person 
with its own rights, it is something that we might regard as something of 
enormous value. Indeed, I would go so far as to say that human life at any 
stage should be regarded as sacred. So, I can very well understand the 
view, did I hold the view that a woman who has an abortion for frivolous 
reasons (there are stories of women who have abortions because they have 
a trip planned to Europe and they don’t want the trip to Europe spoiled by 
their pregnancy), I think they fail to understand something very important: 
their values are entirely wrong, in my view. I take the opposite view about 
a teenage mother, a 13 or 14 year old living in great poverty, no prospect of 
being economically able to raise, no identified or at least identifiable father. 
It seems to me that respect for life at that point switches to a concern for 
her life. I do think, therefore, that there are issues about value that remain 
even after we say a fetus has no rights of its own. There are good ways to 
respect human life, and bad ways. 
Now, the third stage: who gets to make that decision? Earlier in our 
discussion today, someone mentioned the right to ethical independence. I 
think the right to ethical independence, which traces back to my account 
of dignity. Dignity requires that we make decisions that reflect our view 
of what’s important about human life, issues that don’t involve the rights 
of others but do involve questions of respect, questions about whether we 
should lead our lives, the only ones we have, simply trying to acquire mon-
ey, which is a rotten version of what human life is for. I think those have 
to be allowed, even when we know they are going to make mistakes, those 
decisions have got to be allowed to be made by the person whose life is in 
question. And now you see the conclusion I draw: the abortion decision is a 
foundational decision that reflects a person’s sense of how and why human 
life is important. People must be free to make bad decisions. In the case of 
the woman planning her trip to Europe, very bad decisions, those belong to 
the individual, it is not to the collective to make those decisions. 
Now, finally, [the] American experience. We have had since 1973 a lot 
of experience. It’s gone in two ways. First, the question has not gone away. 
Decided by, I think a 72’ decision of the Supreme Court… I’m sorry, in 
1973…many people thought once the Court had spoken, people would ac-
cept the decision. Not at all. There is continuing pressure. The continuing 
pressure calls for legislation State by State. There is now a great tempta-
tion all around the country of the states where the antiabortion sentiment 
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is most lively, to adopt statutes challenging the decision of the Supreme 
Court hoping that the Supreme Court, which is now much more conserva-
tive –very, in fact, right wing–, will finally reverse Roe v. Wade.
So I tell you this history to suggest that the issue, people have not ac-
cepted the decision of the Supreme Court as final, neither have the justices. 
Three of them keep saying “we wait for a chance”. I hope it’s only three.
There’s another side to the story. Abortions have decreased in the 
United States steadily, the number of abortions, and that is because sex 
education, another thing that conservatives dislike, has become much more 
sophisticated and general. The freedom to have an abortion has come along 
with responsibility. [There are] many fewer teenage pregnancies than there 
used to be. And I believe these are connected phenomena, a general shift. 
If we had a national vote on abortion, the present law would be confirmed 
by large. The general opinion in America, like the general opinion about 
gay marriage and various other issues, is shifting demographically because 
young people have different attitudes and, as they grow older, there are 
more of them. But in the case of contraception and abortion, the shift has 
been dramatic. So if Roe v. Wade was repelled and the states were free, all 
the red states would ban abortion and all the blue states…I shouldn’t do 
this in terms of colors. All the states that border the Atlantic and Pacific 
Ocean would reject any prohibition of abortion and a great many of the 
states in between would accept it. But all the polls indicate that the general 
opinion in the country as a whole is permissive.
Now comes the question that I think puzzled a great deal of political 
scientists: would, it, therefore, have been better for the Supreme Court not 
to make its decision in 1973 but to let the demography and to let the in-
creased sophistication be reflected in state legislatures so that democracy 
would have produced the right answer? Many people who are in favor of 
abortion rights think that would have been better. I don’t, for two reasons. 
First, or question number one: I worry about all the women from 1973 until 
some future date which will depend upon the states, all the women who 
would not have had enough money to take themselves to a coastal State. 
I said that abortions are down as a total number; what is also down, obvi-
ously, are deaths from illegal abortions. That was a very serious problem 
in the ghettos and pockets of poverty. Teenage girls couldn’t face being 
pregnant. Their friends knew where to go and some of them ended up dead 
on an operating table or two weeks later of sepsis. I’m always troubled by 
the argument “you should let things take their course; better to have them 
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democratically settled over a long term”. This is still the American story, 
because of course you have one legislature. But I don’t like those stories 
because it treats individuals -in this case poor women- as pawns, expend-
able for the sake of a purer form of democratic theory. In spite of the hor-
rors of the present Supreme Court I still believe in it. There are some issues 
that are legal issues because they are issues about the rights of the minority 
at risk, not to be trusted to the majority in power.
